

\nucs\nptr 5-3-00

April 23, 2000

Notes for NPT Review Conf

1. Negative security assurances given by US at NPTR in 1995 (April 5, 1995) are essentially worthless. (See Janne Nolan, "The Next Nuclear Policy Review?" August 1998). US has been making threats since during Gulf War against non-nuclear states, members of NPT, not associated with a nuclear state: in particular, against not only WMD attack, but against WMD capability or prospective access.

PDD-60 in 1997 "retains the option to initiate the use of nuclear weapons against aggressors, now modified to include non-nuclear states who have "prospective access" to nuclear capabilities. (Bell, Miller, December 1997. Nolan, p. 17). Even before Gulf War, NUWEP (Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy) formulated in early 1991 and issued in 1992 under Cheney, "initiated formal directives to plan for nuclear operations against countries with the potential to develop weapons of mass destruction." (Nolan 18) Also, need to deter acquisition and development of CBW capabilities (1994--even under General Butler!) Deutch testimony (Nolan 19).

March 1996, Perry warnings to Libya, against construction of an underground CBW facility. Controversy over US signing of Africa Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty. Bell: Will not limit options available to the US in response to an attack by an ANWFZ party

using weapons of mass destruction. (Doctrine of "belligerent reprisal"). (Nolan 22)

"Ambiguity" as key rationale for US nuclear doctrine. Or NFU of WMD. May lead to new concepts and designs for nuclear weapons. "That the five 'rogue' states [actually, domestic rogues, in Congress, bureaucracy, WH] are considered more significant influences over US policy than the 178 signatories of the NPT to whom US has made pledges is a crucial determinant of current thinking." (Nolan, 22-23).

2. Continued emphasis on prompt hard-target kill capability, and opposing de-alerting (on this ground, and on making difficult, reconstituting, break-out force...), decapitation, not going below Start II levels (or Framework: 2000-2500), not giving up FU threat or capability, not delegitimising nuclear weapons or FU or FS. Continuity of interest in damage-limiting, hence in first-strike, preemption, hence opposition to de-alerting (even in non-crisis conditions, since it might be hard to reconstitute posture later). So, encouragement of launch-on-warning on both sides...the Pallid Giant problem persists! (See Makhijani on false alarms during crises!) And refusal to get rid of Triad, or land-based systems, largely for this reason! Despite instability. Note the US departure from ABM threatens to undo the Start II rejection of SS-18 and MX! Thus, to protect against ICBMs (that don't exist) from North Korea or Iraq, we reconstitute extreme instability against thousands of Russian warheads, that not only do exist but the reduction of which we will preclude! AM: We even maintain forward-based Trident patrols, (for this preemptive capability, no doubt) which threaten their port-based subs with short-reaction-time attack.

No reliance on or interest in: Mutual safety, cooperative threat reduction, assurance of opponent's security, linkage of disarmament and non-proliferation...

3. To reinforce the importance of nuclear deterrence vs. nuclear threats (for US and other NWS) while reinforcing and expanding such threats against NNWS, is a formula for promoting proliferation. Likewise, the lesson of Kosovo: the US/NATO, even without UN authorization, may act to destroy economies by non-nuclear weapons!

4. First fruits of this: a) India and Pakistan tests; b) Russian increasing reliance on FU threats.

5. See: NATO expansion (without renouncing FU!); Kosovo (which led to nuc threats by Yeltsin, Lukin, Chubais! In case of ground war).

6. Makhijani, Progressive, August 1999, p. 20): April 1999 NATO Summit implied willingness to replot tactical nuclear weapons on surface vessels and attack submarines in other than "normal circumstances."

Makh:pp 22: Need for politically courageous action to reduce these grave nuclear dangers. See Bush in September 1991.

And "nuclear disarmament requires a profound change in political, military, and moral culture worldwide. Such change may not come quickly." 22

US (Clinton) could unilaterally: declare US will not initiate a first-strike.

Can remove all the nuclear bombs the US has stationed in Europe (These are the only nuclear weapons that any state has placed within the territories of other countries." I.e., at present.) (Such deployment violates the spirit of the NPT).

Stop positioning Trident subs near Russian waters.

Place nuclear weapons on de-alert status.